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Federal Diversity Jurisdiction for
Naturalized Dual Nationals-Sadat v.
Mertes
Moheb A.H. Al Sadat, a naturalized American citizen who was also
an Egyptian citizen, brought an action in United States District Court to
recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile acci-
dent in Wisconsin. At the time of the accident Sadat was a domiciliary of
Pennsylvania. When the action was brought, however, he was residing in
Egypt. Sadat invoked the court's jurisdiction based on "diversity of citi-
zenship" since the defendants were either citizens of Wisconsin or Con-
necticut. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Be-
cause of the plaintiff's connection with Egypt, he was not a "citizen" of
Pennsylvania for the purposes of diversity.'
On appeal,' Sadat based two of his three arguments on the diversity
section of the U.S. Code, which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects
or a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.'
First, Sadat argued that he was domiciliary of Pennsylvania and
could thus be considered a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction. Second, he argued that by virtue of his dual American-Egyp-
tian citizenship he was a citizen of a foreign state and therefore jurisdic-
tion existed for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction, that is, he was a
"subject" of a foreign state.4 Third, he argued that the defendants should
have been estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court since
two years had lapsed from the filing of the action before the defendants
asserted the jurisdiction defense. The Court of Appeals summarily dis-
posed of the first and third contentions. It found that Sadat was not a
domiciliary of Pennsylvania at the time the action was commenced, find-
1. Sadat v. Mertes, 434 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
2. 615 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
4. The power conferred on the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) is often referred
to as alienage jurisdiction.
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ing instead that he was an American citizen domiciled abroad and there-
fore not a citizen of a State for purposes of diversity.'
Sadat contended, and the court of appeals admitted, that Egypt had
consented to his request for permission to acquire American citizenship
but that that consent was conditioned upon his retention of his Egyptian
citizenship. The court recognized that the generally accepted test for de-
termining whether a party to a suit is a foreign citizen is whether the
country whose citizenship is claimed would recognize the party as one of
its citizens. The court stated that "whether a person possessing dual na-
tionality should be considered a citizen or subject of a foreign state within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) [was] a question of first impression
in the courts of appeals." Two other district courts had reached "seem-
ingly different conclusions '" in their encounters with the question.
In the case of Aguirre v. Nagel,' the plaintiff was a native-born
American citizen who possessed dual nationality by virtue of her parents'
Mexican citizenship. Since both the minor plaintiff and the defendant
were citizens of the same state the trial court agreed with the defendant's
contention that the court lacked jurisdiction through diversity. The court
found that the position of the plaintiff as a citizen of Mexico, despite her
American citizenship, placed her squarely within the provisions of subsec-
tion (a)(2) of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, that is, "a citizen or subject of a foreign
state."
The Court of Appeals in Sadat found "[t]he Aguirre court's opinion
did no more than determine that the cause fell within the literal language
of the statute without regard to the policies underlying alienage jurisdic-
tion."9 The court noted that the decision was criticized by commentators,
but the principle focus of those critics dealt with the fact that the Aguirre
decision violated the rule of complete diversity established in the early
Supreme Court case of Strawbridge v. Curtiss0 since both parties were
residents (and thus citizens) of the same state. As pointed out by one of
the critics cited by the Sadat court of appeals, the Aguirre decision is
also inconsistent with the accepted rule that both citizenships of a corpo-
ration (the state in which it is chartered and the state of its principal
place of business) must be considered to determine if jurisdiction exists
under diversity." If any of the parties opposing the corporation is a citi-
zen of either of the states of which the corporation is a citizen, diversity
jurisdiction will not be found. Since Sadat was not a citizen of the same
state as any of the defendants, finding jurisdiction under subsection (2) of
5. 615 F.2d at 1178.
6. Id. at 1185.
7. The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin was a third court to con-
sider the question.
8. 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
9. 615 F.2d at 1185.
10. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
11. See, e.g., Brocon v. Clorox Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 306, 128 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1976).
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) would not have violated the complete diversity re-
quirement established in Strawbridge, nor would it have offended the
rule with respect to corporations.
A contrary view was offered by the District Court for the Central
District of California in Raphael v. Hertzberg,12 in which a recently natu-
ralized British subject asserted dual nationality as the basis for federal
jurisdiction. The plaintiff and all of the defendants were residents of Cali-
fornia. The court found that the holding in Aguirre violated the require-
ment of complete diversity established in Strawbridge and dismissed the
plaintiff's claim upon the finding that he did not possess dual citizenship
but was only a citizen of the United States since he was required to re-
nounce his allegiance to Britain in order to acquire his American
citizenship.
Although the Raphael decision was founded upon Raphael's renunci-
ation of his allegiance to Great Britain, the court noted in dicta several
policy reasons to reject the plaintiff's claim even if he were found to be a
dual national. Besides violating the complete diversity requirement in
Strawbridge, the court noted that there was "no reason to expect bias
from state courts'" where both parties are residents of the same state.
Moreover, there would be little reason to expect Great Britain to be af-
fronted by a decision affecting one of its subjects if that decision was not
made on a national level since the plaintiff had voluntarily subjected him-
self both to the laws of the United States and of the individual states by
choosing to become an American citizen. Finally, the court concluded that
opening the federal courts to naturalized citizens based on the concept of
dual nationality would render their rights superior to those of native-born
American citizens by providing the former with greater access to federal
courts than the latter.
The court of appeals in Sadat rejected the holding set forth in the
Raphael decision and adopted the rationale set forth in the dicta. In its
analysis, the court first set forth the reasoning behind alienage jurisdic-
tion, citing Hamilton's Federalist Paper No. 80 for the proposition that
"the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of the part.""'
Alienage jurisdiction is designed to insure the maintenance of harmony
with foreign states by handling suits involving their citizens at a national
rather than local level, as well as to protect against the failure of individ-
ual states to give protection to foreigners under treaties. The court con-
tinued to state the general test for the determination of foreign citizen-
ship for the purposes of alienage jurisdiction, that is, "whether the
country in which citizenship is claimed would so recognize" the claimant
as a citizen.1 5 By recognizing the "right of each country to determine who
12. 470 F. Supp. 984 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
13. Id. at 986.
14. 615 F.2d at 1182.
15. Id. at 1183.
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. ..its nationals are,"1 6 the court seemed to be setting Sadat up for cov-
erage squarely within the literal language of subsection (a)(2). Unlike the
Raphael court, however, the Sadat court of appeals made no finding that
the plaintiff's naturalization and renunciation of allegiance to foreign
states or sovereignties resulted in the recognition by U.S. courts of only
one citizenship-his U.S. citizenship-for purposes of jurisdiction. Thus,
although the court noted that the U.S. Government's official policy is to
discourage dual nationality, it also noted that U.S. courts and the State
Department consistently have recognized its existence.
Having found that Sadat possessed dual citizenship, being a citizen
of both the United States and Egypt, the court determined that Sadat
was not a citizen or subject of a foreign state within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Rather than relying on the literal language of the
statute, which it accused the Aguirre court of doing, it followed the dicta
of Raphael and looked to the policies underlying alienage jurisdiction to
find that the statute was not meant to cover a foreign citizen who was
also a United States citizen.
There is authority for such a liberal interpretation of the statute.17 In
going beyond the literal language of the statute, the court stated that
"the paramount purpose of the alienage jurisdiction provision [is] to
avoid offense to foreign nations because of the possible appearance of in-
justice to their citizens."18 The court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law" for the principle that a national is not responsi-
16. Id.
17. As stated in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534 (1940):
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purposes of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even
the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court
has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there cer-
tainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words
may be on 'superficial examination.' The interpretation of the meaning of the
statutes is exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body of pub-
lic servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another body, the
legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to
legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views or
by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the
danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an
acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts
available information for reaching a correct conclusion.
Id. at 543-44.
18. 615 F.2d at 1186.
19. RzSTATEMENT (SzcoaN) or THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrE STATES
§ 171 (1965).
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ble to another nation under international law for conduct which is wrong-
ful to a citizen of the latter state when he is also a citizen of the former
state. By analogy, the court held that ordinarily "only the American na-
tionality of the dual citizen should be recognized under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)." The court stated:
This rule recognizes that in the usual case a foreign country cannot
complain about the treatment received by one of its citizens by a
country which also regards that person as a national. This principle
suggests that the risk of 'entanglements with other sovereigns that
might ensue from failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a
national level,' Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp. at
500, is slight when an American citizen is also a citizen of another
country and therefore he ordinarily should only be regarded as an
American citizen for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 20
The court also recognized the exception to the general rule in the concept
of "effective or dominant nationality. 21 The court found that Sadat's vol-
untary nationalization in the United States, as well as his actions subse-
quent to his naturalization, precluded him from invoking 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2) based on such-an exception.
The court's decision leaves open the possibility of an American dual
national invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). By
recognizing dual citizenship, the concept of dominant nationality, and
recognizing that a person's citizenship is not exclusively determinable by
the laws of the forum state, the court fails to preclude U.S. citizens en-
tirely from invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). For
example, if the plaintiff in Aguirre had not been a resident of the same
state as the defendant and was able to establish that her dominant na-
tionality was Mexican (based on her parents' citizenship and intent to
return to Mexico), the Sadat court of appeals seems to indicate that it
would find jurisdiction to exist. The court also makes clear that the com-
plete diversity requirement for corporations with regard to state citizen-
ship is not always applicable by analogy to cases involving diversity of
national citizenship. As the court pointed out under the corporations
analogy, an American dual national would thus be able to assert his for-
eign nationality to avoid federal jurisdiction in an action by a non-na-
tional of the United States. As the court stated, "[a]rguably, cases such as
this are precisely those in which a federal forum should be afforded the
foreign litigant in the interest of preventing international friction.""2
Dirk T. Biermann
20. 615 F.2d at 1187.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1186.
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